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Introduction
In November 2005 Japan's Liberal Democratic Party will celebrate the 50th anniversary of its founding. Apart from a short period in 1993/94, the LDP governed Japan during these 50 years, most of the time on its own. The LDP is thus a prime example of a dominant party, if not the dominant party. Dominant parties in other democracies, e.g. the Italian Democrazia Christiana or the Israeli Labour Party, have lost their grip on power or disappeared altogether; but the Japanese Liberal Democrats are still in government. The LDP still is the most popular party in Japan, it dominates parliament and the executive. What explains the success of the LDP? How did the LDP attain its dominant position? And how did it manage to cling to its for such a long time? These questions will be addressed in this paper which will discuss the LDP's rise to power, its power resources and strategies for staying in power.
The following analysis proceeds in four steps. First, the general concept and characteristics of a dominant party are introduced. Here, we will also sketch the analytically relevant dimensions of a party's dominant position -electoral, parliamentary, and executive dominance. In a second step, we will highlight the origins and context of the LDP's rise to power, taking into account both domestic and international variables but also the strategies of the party itself. In a third step, we will discuss how the LDP managed to keep its dominant position. The discussion will centre on the links between the LDP and voters, the role of Japan's national electoral system, and the LDP's management of public policies. In a fourth step, new challenges the party has had to face since the 1990s are addressed. A brief section on the perspectives of the LDP concludes the paper. Köllner: The LDP at 50 6
Defining and Analysing Dominant Parties
Why is it worthwhile to spend intellectual energy on dominant parties? We would like to suggest two reasons, one more academic and one more practical one. If we understand, taking a cue from Robert Dahl, political science as the systematic analysis of relationships of power and influence among human beings (Dahl et al. 2004: 377) , dominant parties are of particular relevance because of the high degree of power and influence they possess. How they use this power and influence is of practical importance to citizens in the countries concerned. Negative consequences for democracy due to the dominant position of a party cannot be ruled out. 1 Before we will focus on the LDP, we will first delineate the topic of dominant parties in a conceptual and analytical manner.
What exactly is a dominant party? And what role does it play in a party system? For decades political scientists including Maurice Duverger and Giovanni Sartori have grappled with these questions. More than fifty years ago, Duverger defined a dominant party as follows:
"A party becomes a dominant party when it represents a whole epoch, when its ideas, its methods, its whole style are identical with those of an epoch. A ruling party is one which is believed to be one. Even the enemies of a dominant party, even citizens who do not vote for it, acknowledge its superior status and its influence; they deplore it, but they admit it." (Duverger 1959 (Duverger [1951 : 317, translation by the author) Authors more interested in inter-party competition have tried to come to terms with dominant party systems, following the lead of Sartori (1976: 92-101) . Andrew Heywood has stated that a 'dominant party system is competitive in the sense that a number of parties compete for power in popular elections, but is dominated by a single major party that consequently enjoys prolonged periods in power'. (Heywood 1997: 243-244, cit There are so far only few comparative treatments of dominant parties. Following the lead of the volume edited by Pempel (1990) on dominant parties in industrialised countries, another volume edited by Giliomee and Simkins (1999) has focused on the four young or electoral democracies South Africa, Malaysia, Mexico, and Taiwan. The volume edited by Wekkin et al. (1993) restricts itself to descriptions of democratisation processes in former East European and non-European one-party states. The volume edited by Rimanelli (1999) exhibits an even wider geographical scope but remains at a fairly descriptive level. In early 2005 an ECPR Joint Sessions workshop on 'dominant parties and democracy' has been devoted to the analysis of the background, the internal life, and consequences of dominant parties in various parts of the world (www.essex.ac.uk/ ecpr/events/jointsessions/granada/workshop_list.aspx). Another workshop, organised by the German Overseas Institute, on the impact of dominant parties on democracy and the fate of former dominant-authoritarian parties will take place in spring 2006.
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With regard to dominant parties per se, there is so far no consensus on the yardstick to be applied to contenders for the title of a 'dominant party'. Diverging opinions exist with regard to the necessary length of time in government, the necessary share of seats and votes or the necessity of ideological hegemony of the party in question (Bogaards 2004: 174-176; Dunleavy 2005: 4-5) . But even the most comprehensive list of requirements for a dominant party, put together by Brendan O'Leary, is met by the LDP. O'Leary (1994: 4) postulates that a dominant party in democratic systems has to exhibit the following characteristics: -First, the party must be dominant in number: it must regularly win more seats in parliamentary or congressional elections than its opponents.
Secondly, the party must enjoy a dominant bargaining position. It must be able to stay in government on a regular basis. It is must share power with smaller parties, […] it is nevertheless the key agent in the political system, with privileged access to the key executive and legislative posts. Finally a dominant party must be ideologically dominant: it must be capable of using government to shape public policy so that the nature of the state and the society over which it presides is fundamentally changed. 3 We can now turn to the challenges faced by dominant or would-be-dominant parties. In conceptual-analytical terms, we are thus dealing with the various dimensions of dominance. Boucek (1998) distinguishes three concrete dimensions or -from the viewpoint of the parties in question -challenges. First, there is the dimension of electoral dominance which refers to the aspect of vote acquisition. Boucek (1998: 105) notes that " [d] ominant parties achieve electoral dominance by maximizing their electoral support. They aggregate broad segments of the electorate through successful collective appeals (via issues and policies) and preferenceaccommodating strategies." In other words, the dimension of electoral dominance is concerned with the question of how dominant parties attract a large number of voters to lay the basis for a hegemonial position in a country's party system (see also Nyblade 2005: 3) .
The second dimension focuses on parliamentary dominance. Of interest is here how votes won in parliamentary elections are translated into seats. This is for one a question of the mechanical aspects of electoral systems (i.e. the concrete modes of transforming votes into seats) and the instrumental aspects of electoral systems (the design and re-design of electoral 3 O'Leary's list is based mainly on Pempel (1990a: 3-4) who, however, does not state the necessity of ideological dominance but simply talks of a national political agenda being shaped by interlocking policies.
Köllner: The LDP at 50 8 systems with the aim of ensuring as many seats as possible for the largest party). Of potential importance in this respect is also the dominant party's co-operation with other parties within the framework of electoral alliances. Of sometimes even greater importance can be how the other parties co-ordinate among themselves ahead of elections. Clearly, maintaining a dominant position in parliament is easier when the opposition follows non-cooperative election strategies by not working together in terms of candidacies and voter mobilization (Boucek 1998: 107; Nyblade 2005: 3, 15-16) .
Thirdly, there is the dimension of executive dominance. For dominant parties without a parliamentary majority of their own, the question of entering into and maintaining coalitions is of importance in this regard. In most general terms, the positioning of a party in or near the centre of the relevant ideological spectrum makes entering coalitions easier. 4 Dominant parties can also reap advantages from the formal and informal rules governing which party will be asked first to form a government and which committee posts go to which party. For the dominant parties with a majority of their own, internal co-ordination can become a vital question. Intra-party groups, so-called factions, can play an important role in terms of the management of dominant parties (Boucek 1998 : 107-108, see also Nyblade 2005 .
Addressing the dimensions of dominance one after another, will now turn to the case of the LDP. We will start by discussing how the LDP became the dominant actor in Japan's party system.
Origins and Context of the LDP's Dominance
As Guiseppe di Palma (1990) has noted, it is not easy to establish one-party dominance in democratic systems. It takes favourable constellations and environmental conditions. Yet on their own these are not sufficient to explain the establishment of a dominant position within a party system. Every relevant explanation has to take into consideration the strategies of the party in question. We will illustrate this with a view to the LDP.
In simplifying a complicated story somewhat, we can first note that the international environment favoured the dominance of the LDP from the party's founding in 1955, but it did not determine it. Surely, the weakening of the Left, in particular the Communists, within the context of the 'red purge' undertaken by the US occupation authority in 1947/48 5 provided the now unified conservative political elite with a good starting position. The LDP also benefited from material help provided by both Japan's business community and -as in the case 4 On this and other aspects of the coalition potential of political parties see Bartolini (1998) . 9 of Italy's Democrazia Christiana -the CIA (cf. Johnson 1995) . With regard to political issues, the demilitarisation and the loss of the sovereign right to wage war, both forced upon the Japan by the occupation authorities, proved to be quite popular with the citizens of Japan (cf. Katzenstein and Okawara 1993: 109; Katzenstein 1996: 118-120) . Under the protection of the US nuclear umbrella, Japan could concentrate her resources on economic revival.
Against this background the demand of the Socialists for a neutralization of the country did not receive widespread support, thus relieving the opposition of a powerful lever in elections (cf. Otake 1990) . Nevertheless, as in other cases of the rise of dominant parties (see Di Palma 1990) , the dominance of the Conservatives cannot be fully explained by reference to the international constellation in general and the role of the Americans in particular.
A favourable domestic factor seems to be of greater importance in this context: The LDP was able to rely on an organized support base in the form of farmers and small shop owners.
Such social linkages endowed the Liberal Democrats with important 'vote banks'. In the course of time, the LDP expanded this original support base by adding other social groups.
As a consequence, the LDP evolved -on paper at least -into the conservative party which could boast most members in an industrialized country. 6 The organized support base of the LDP stood in contrast to Japan's fragmented labour movement which did not make the task to assume power any easier for the Left (Pempel 1990a: 27, 29 ). Finally, it should not be overlooked that the economic rise of Japan, starting in the 1950s, proved favourable to the establishment of a dominant position of the Liberal Democrats. Though opposition parties were able to expand their presence in parliament in spite of the country's economic achievements, Japan's economic rise gave the LDP the resources which it needed to satisfy sectional interests and important voter groups (see below).
Explanations of a party's dominance are not sufficient without taking into account the respective strategies of the relevant parties. Here it should at least be mentioned that in terms of inter-party competition, the LDP chose in the beginning to take a tough line against the Left. 7 In the second half of the 1950s, the leaders of the LDP, prime ministers Yoshida Shigeru and Kishi Nobosuke, tried to delegitimise the leftist opposition (Pempel 1990b: 346-347) . They thus followed a pattern also observable in other cases where dominant parties assumed power. The leaders of the LDP brandished the leftist alternative to them as an un-6 In 1991, at the height of the rise of its membership, the LDP had according to its own figures nearly 5.5 million members. Back then the organisational density of the LDP (i.e. party members as a share of the electorate) was nearly six times as high as that of the German CDU. For details see Köllner (2005c: chapter 3) where also the LDP's official membership numbers are discussed.
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This did however not hinder the LDP from cultivating co-operative informal relationships with the opposition parties in the decades to come (cf. Christensen 2000: 125-128) . For a good overview of conflict and co-operation between parties in the Japanese parliament see Richardson (1997: chapter 6) . democratic force intent on doing away with the constitutional order. Certainly, the rejectionist attitude of the Socialists and Communists vis-à-vis a number of institutions enshrined in the constitution -the self-defence forces, a market economy, the emperor, to name just a few -offered sufficient grounds for friction. In the context of the Cold War, polarization thus formed an important strategy of the LDP in terms of inter-party competition.
Maintaining a Dominant Position until the Early 1990s
It is one thing to establish a dominant position in a party system, another to keep this position for an extended period. How do dominant parties defy for such a long time "the inevitable rhythmic swing of the pendulum of the voter" (Nyblade 2005: 22) ? Patrick Dunleavy (2005: 12) has argued that dominant parties are simply more effective than other parties.
And as Nyblade (2005: 20) adds dominant parties are more successful than other parties in terms of 'surviving' in government. Greater effectiveness and success can have a number of sources. As suggested by Dunleavy (2005: 13) , first there is better access to financial flows -a governing party which everybody expects to remain in power in the medium to long run can reasonably expect a higher willingness on the part of business and other organized interests to donate to its coffers. In addition, dominant parties have the advantage of receiving more media coverage than other parties. 8 A structural advantage most dominant parties enjoy lies in their support by important interest groups or organizations. In some cases links to predominant ethnic or linguistic groups within society may exist. Particular historical achievements, e.g. in the process of democratic transition, gaining independence or the establishment of an encompassing social security system, can endow parties with a strong momentum, or in other words: long-term support by a broad spectrum of voters. Besides, dominant parties can hold coalition advantages due to their central position in political competition. Finally, the electoral system can favour the biggest party or can at least can make its deselection more difficult (Dunleavy 2005: 13-14) . 9 While there is per se not much to say against such a listing of factors which might individually or cumulatively help to shore up the dominant position of a certain party, it remains somewhat unsatisfactory in analytical terms -in particular when one attempts to capture the dynamics of dominance over an extended period. In analytical and conceptual terms it seems more fruitful to pinpoint, with respect to the separate dimensions of party domi-8 Where a free press exists, this can however also turn into a disadvantage when scandals are uncovered.
nance, the sources of dominance and their changes in the course of time. With regard to both the parliamentary and the executive dominance of the Japanese Liberal Democrats, the particular role of the electoral system in Japan has repeatedly been emphasized. Until 1993, the so-called single non-transferable voting system (SNTV for short) was used in Japan in electoral districts with on average four MPs. SNTV is a peculiar creature. It combines the decision rule of the majority principle at the local level with a relatively high degree of proportionality (in terms of the votes-seats ratio) at the national level (Lijphart 1999) . Under SNTV every voter has a single vote which s/he gives to a particular candidate at the local level. The candidates receiving the highest number of votes in a district are elected. 'Excess votes', i.e. votes going beyond the number required for a candidate to get elected, cannot be transferred to another candidate of the same party in this electoral district -hence non-transferable voting system.
Under SNTV Japanese parties aiming at a majority of seats in parliament had to present more than one candidate in many electoral districts. This led to co-ordination problems. If a party nominated too many candidates in a given district, the result could be the collective failure of the candidates in question (so-called tomodaore). Against this background rationalchoice analysts have tried to show that the LDP was particularly apt at solving its coordination problems by means of effective nomination strategies (Cox 1996 (Cox , 1997 Boucek 1998: 116) . 10 Other scholars have partially rejected this argument. For example, Christensen (2000) has shown that in cases in which the opposition parties co-operated partly or fully in national elections, it was sometimes even better able to co-ordinate its candidates than the LDP. However, such effective co-operation between two or more opposition parties re- SNTV generally generates incentives to pursue candidate-oriented vote-mobilization activities (Grofman 1999) . With regard to the Japanese case, the ability to engage in pork barrelling proved to be an advantage for the ruling LDP, an advantage other parties did not possess (Cox 1996; Nyblade 2005: 16) . Individual LDP candidates also reacted to the electoral system by firmly institutionalising personal support organizations, so-called kôenkai. A well-functioning kôenkai was seen as a precondition for obtaining the necessary number of votes under SNTV -in particular in electoral districts where more than one candidate from a 10 Optimal candidate nomination strategies have to be based on proper evaluations of vote potentials and thus learning processes. A totally 'rational' nomination behaviour however seems not possible because of intra-party barriers and informational uncertainty (Baker and Scheiner 2004) . See on this point also the controversy between Patterson (1999, 2002) One further aspect of the electoral system which continues to be of relevance even after the reform of the electoral system in 1993 concerns malapportionment. Woodall (1999: 34, 35) has came to the conclusion that " See e.g. Grofman (1999: 381) and the literature cited there. 12 On personal support organisations of Japanese politicians see in detail Köllner (2005c: chapter 5) . 13 For a discussion of redistricting since the early 1990s see Christensen (2004) who argues, inter alia, that partisan gerrymandering is no longer possible. dominance. With regard to the electoral dominance of the Liberal Democrats, the party's success in linking up with numerous interest groups has to be mentioned. The LDP was able to base itself on a 'grand coalition' of different organizations (Okimoto 1988a) . That many organized interests at the national level were drawn toward the LDP is not really surprising:
for many years the Liberal Democrats were the only party which could not only formulate policies but also to implement them and to reward groups belonging to its 'grand coalition' (George Mulgan 2000: 423; Steslicke 1973: 12) . Even groups which at first stood in opposition to the LDP, eventually had to come to terms with the party if they did not want to be marginalized (Pempel 1990a: 27) . Being in power for such a long time, the LDP was able to concerns the orientation of policies towards the broad and diffuse segment of political nonorganized voters. In this context, welfare, environmental, and other policies have been aimed at improving the quality of life. Voters targeted by these measures include whitecollar employees, housewives, the self-employed, and young inhabitants of urban areas. In the 1970s in particular, the LDP demonstrated an astounding ability to adapt its policies to changing social needs (Stockwin 1999: 145; Pempel 1982) . Last but not least reference has to 14 be made to the successful crisis management of the LDP. As Kent Calder (1988) has shown, the LDP repeatedly managed to avert a loss a power by securing important voter groups through distributive political measures such as tax gifts, subsidies, or the introduction of welfare-oriented policy instruments.
Finally, the oppositional left, clinging to positions which were at odds with reality, made it comparatively easy for the LDP until the early 1990s. 16 The increasing fragmentation of the opposition since the 1960s 17 and its only temporary electoral co-operation at the national level likewise contributed to reducing the chances of the JSP-led opposition to assume power.
We have already referred to one important aspect of the executive dominance of the LDP, viz. the use of clientelism and patronage to cement relations with relevant support groups.
Some other aspects of this dimension will now be touched upon. Challenges to the LDP in the area of executive dominance centred primarily on intra-party management. But even there the LDP was able to master these challenges by means of informal institutions.
Until the early 1990s the LDP did not have to share governmental power with another party -only between 1983 and 1986 the LDP was forced to enter into a coalition with the Neoliberal Club (NLC), a group of reform-oriented former LDP MPs. However, even during this brief period key posts remained with the LDP: the NLC was represented in cabinet by only one minister (Stockwin 2003: 188) . Thanks to its majority in the parliament the LDP was also able to dominate committees in both the Lower and the Upper House. The party was thus able to pre-structure the legislative process. Politically important discussions took anyway mainly place in party organs rather than in the Diet (see also footnote 18).
Being in possession of sole parliamentary majorities most of the time, the main challenge the LDP faced in the executive dimension did not concern co-ordination processes in the cabinet or the Diet but rather intra-party management. Here intra-party groups, so-called factions (habatsu), played a major role. These increasingly firmly institutionalised power groups assumed tasks in the areas of candidate nomination, the acquisition of funds, and the alloca- As noted by Duverger (1959: 321) many years ago, every dominant party carries within itself the seeds of its own destruction. Long-term rule can lead to a party's wearing out and loss of vitality: "To the same degree that dominance stabilizes political life it also makes it tensionless. The dominant party […] calcifies." (Duverger 1959: 319 , translation by the author)
Moreover, patronage-based strategies aimed at staying in power can turn over time into a boomerang by undermining the cohesion, the principles, the autonomy, the flexibility, and finally the ability of parties to win votes (Warner 1997) .
18 On the origins, institutionalisation of LDP factions but also their functions and consequences see Köllner (2005c: chapter 4) . It should be noted that the factions did only play a limited role with regard to policy-making. Material policy was discussed and decided upon within the framework of trans-factional organs and groups. The LDP's central decision-making body, the Policy Affairs Research Council, has never been colonised by factions but rather by groups of influential MPs, socalled tribes (zoku), bound together by their interest and expertise in certain policy areas. That some factions were more involved in a given policy area than others is a different matter. For details see Köllner (2005c: chapter 3) and the literature cited therein.
16
Japan's Liberal Democratic Party is certainly not immune to such dynamics. The chain of large-scale corruption scandals in the late 1980s and early 1990s were a warning sign in this respect. 19 In the end however it was an intra-party conflict -and thus a problem in the domain of executive dominance -which brought the LDP down in 1993: After parts of its most powerful faction left the LDP, the party lost its majority in the July 1993 Lower House election. The LDP remained by far the biggest party in the Lower House but it was not able to compensate for the prior loss of 45 incumbent MPs, many of which were firmly entrenched in their individual electoral districts. As a consequence, a seven-party coalition under the leadership of Hosokawa Morihiro was able to assume power. 20 Whether a longer period out of power would have led the LDP to a fate similar to that of Italy's former dominant party, the Democrazia Christiana, remains a matter of speculation.
But the LDP benefited from tensions inside the new coalition government which -after only ten months in opposition -brought the LDP, assisted by its former political foe, the Social- The short intermezzo of the Hosokawa government however had long-term consequences:
political reforms enacted in early 1994 brought about a new hybrid electoral system which due to its strong majoritarian component makes turnovers in government easier than under the preceding SNTV system. Moreover, the reform of political financing contributed to a significant decline of donations by the corporate sector which at the same time was negatively affected by Japan's economic weakness. The introduction of the new electoral system and new regulations on the financing of political activities weakened central foundations on which the LDP's factions had been built. As a consequence, the intra-party groups lost in 19 See e.g. Curtis (1999: 73-78, 85-87) on these corruption scandals. 20 The background of the LDP split, the establishment and eventual fall of the new coalition government are discussed in detail by Curtis (1999: chapters 2 and 3). 21 Government coalitions in Japan since the mid-1990s have included the Shintô Sakigake (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) ) Japan is moving towards two-party competition at the electoral district level. As a result, the LDP has lost its nimbus of being the 'natural' governing party of Japan.
Conclusions
The before-said does not mean that the end of the dominance of the Liberal Democrats is just around the corner. But such a scenario can also not totally be excluded. The future of the LDP depends on how it will master the challenges in all three dimensions of dominance. In other words, will the party be able to uphold its electoral dominance by means of being able to offer attractive policy platforms and personnel? Or will the party at least be able to frame electoral issues in a favourable way? Will the LDP be able to hold fast to traditional support groups and can it win over a substantial part of floating voters? Can the DPJ strengthen its claim to be a trustworthy and reliable challenger of the LDP? Will the opposition parties be able to forge effective electoral alliances in order to break the parliamentary dominance of the LDP? And with respect to the executive dominance of the LDP: will the coalition with New Komeitô, on whose vote mobilization efforts the LDP has increasingly become de- 22 For details see Köllner (2005a Köllner ( or 2005c : chapter 7).
18 pendent, hold? Or will the DPJ be able to drag New Kômeitô into its own boat? The answers to these questions will determine to a large extent at what point the dominant status of the LDP will only be of interest to historians.
